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INTRODUCTION 
The principal purpose of copyright law in the United States is to 
protect the pecuniary rights of copyright holders.1  The law ensures that 
copyright holders retain exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute their 
original works, to prepare derivative works, and to publicly perform and 
display certain types of works.2  Thus, the law—codified in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 [1976 Act]—primarily concerns the economic 
value of a copyright.3 
 In copyright infringement cases, two types of remedies are 
generally available upon determining liability: (1) the copyright holder’s 
actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer,4 or (2) 
statutory damages.5  The first remedy involves a relatively 
straightforward evaluation of evidence; the copyright holder is required 
only to provide proof of the infringer’s gross revenue, while the infringer 
must prove both deductible expenses and profits not attributable to the 
copyrighted work.6  By contrast, calculating statutory damages in such 
cases is comparatively more complicated. 
To compute statutory damages, the court examines, among other 
factors, evidence of willful infringement and potential fair use defenses.7 
But because statutory damages are decided on a “per work” basis,8 the 
difficulty lies in accurately defining what constitutes “one work,” and 
the Circuits are split on the issue.9  The 1976 Act reads, in relevant part: 
“[T]he copyright holder may elect . . . to recover . . . an award of statutory 
damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any 
one work  . . . all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute 
1. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Moral Rights for University Employees and Students: Can
Educational Institutions Do Better than the U.S. Copyright Law?, 27 J.C. & U.L. 53 (2000). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1) (West 2017). 
5. § 504(a)(2) (West 2017). 
6. § 504(b) (West 2017). 
7. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017). 
8. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017). 
9. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The circuits are split as 
to how to determine what constitutes ‘one work’ for purposes of statutory damages 
calculations.”). 
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one work” (emphases added).10 
The Circuits disagree as to the correct interpretation of “one 
work,”11 and this lack of uniformity among the courts leads to 
uncertainty in awarding damages in copyright infringement cases.  For 
each infringed work, the copyright holder may receive statutory 
damages ranging from $750 to $30,000,12 depending upon the court’s 
judgment of fair compensation.13  If, for example, the infringed work is 
one album and the copyright holder elects to recover statutory damages, 
the award would total at least $750, but no more than $30,000, for a 
single work.  By contrast, if the court considers each of the album’s ten 
music tracks as separate works (and finds that all of them have been 
infringed), then statutory damages could amount to $300,000 (four 
hundred times the amount awarded to the copyright holder of the lone 
infringed album).14  Certainly, the court’s determination of the number 
of infringed works in a particular case “strongly impacts the amount of 
the statutory damage award.”15 
Therefore, the Circuit split, on the issue of deciding the number of 
infringed works in any given case, creates ambiguity that should be 
eliminated to provide consistency in awarding statutory damages.  This 
note will first review the history of copyright law in the United States as 
it relates to statutory damages (focusing on the development of the 1976 
Act), then assess the two tests for “one work” currently employed by the 
courts, and finally propose a solution for resolving the divide among the 
Circuits by blending the two approaches together to balance the 
economic value of a copyright with the obligation to uphold copyright 
law as the fundamental mechanism for protecting creation. 
10. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017). 
11. BMG Rights Mgmt., 199 F. Supp. 3d at 983. 
12. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017). 
13. If the court finds that the infringer did not know and had no reason to know that his
or her acts constituted copyright infringement, the court may reduce the statutory damages 
award to a minimum of $200. But in cases where the infringement was committed willfully, 
the court may increase the statutory damages award to a maximum of $150,000. 17 U.S.C.A. 
§ 504(c)(2) (West 2017). 
14. See generally Sarah A. Zawada, “Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different
Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on the Deterrence Goal of Copyright Law, 
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 129 (2006) (providing examples to highlight the effect of 
the court’s determination of the number of infringing works on statutory damages 
calculations). 
15. Id. 
378 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:58 
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Damages: The Copyright Acts of 1790, 1909, and 1976
At common law, copyright holders were entitled only to actual
damages and profits as compensation for infringement.16  In some 
circumstances, however, the courts could not ascertain these figures with 
sufficient accuracy.17  Consequently, Congress implemented statutory 
damages as an alternative to actual damages and profits.18 
The earliest provision for statutory damages, the 1790 Act, 
“ ‘ specifically . . . recognize[d] the rights of authors.’ ” 19  During the 
nineteenth century, Congress expanded the remedies available to victims 
of copyright infringement, and all such legislation was eventually 
consolidated into the 1909 Act.20  This newer Act was the first to offer 
copyright holders the option to choose between actual damages and 
profits and “such damages as to the court shall appear just.”21  In addition 
to other provisions, the 1909 Act offered guidelines to assist the court in 
assessing statutory damages.22  Even at its inception, statutory damages 
presented a question of interpretation—in this case, of the number of 
infringing performances: at least one court understood these guidelines 
as indicating that “one ‘infringement’ may nevertheless result in more 
than one ‘performance.’ ” 23  The 1909 Act limited statutory damages to 
no less than $250 and no more than $5,000 per infringement.24 
Despite having combined then-current copyright legislation into 
one cohesive document, the 1909 Act was not without defects, 
necessitating Congress to revise the law again in 1976.25  The 1976 Act 
purported to clarify unclear phrasing in the 1909 Act with regard to 
calculating statutory damages,26 but post-1976 courts have nonetheless 
diverged in their interpretation of the word “work” to include both 
16. Id. at 130. 
17. Id. at 131. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. (quoting William F. Patry, Latman’s The Copyright Law 4 (6th ed. 1986)).
20. Zawada, supra note 14, at 131. 
21. Id.; see also Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 25(b), 35 Stat.
1074 (1909), superseded by 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) section 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 
1909. 
22. Zawada, supra, note 14 at 132. 
23. Id. at 133. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 133. 
26. Id. 
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infringing27works and infringed works.28  Moreover, the Circuits remain 
divided over the proper definition of “one work”: “To be sure, the last 
sentence of § 504(c)(1) is facially ambiguous as to . . . whether a 
compilation that infringes multiple separate copyrights . . . constitutes 
‘one work.’”29 
B. Compensatory Versus Non-Compensatory (Punitive) Damages:
Compensation, Deterrence, and Punishment
The primary purpose of statutory damages is to compensate the 
copyright holder whose rights have been infringed.30  Prior to 1909, the 
law merged compensatory, deterrent, and penal functions into one 
remedy for infringement.31  Through the Copyright Act of 1909, 
Congress separated these objectives by devising a criminal provision “to 
punish infringements that were both willful and for profit,” and by 
constructing “a nonpenal statutory damage regime” to compensate 
copyright holders in cases where actual damages were difficult to prove, 
with a stated range of awards that could serve to deter infringement.32 
But when, in 1976, Congress revised the Copyright Act, the 
compensatory and penal functions again became entwined.33  The 1976 
Act introduced “very modest damages for the exceptional cases of 
innocent infringement, a rather broad range of damages for ordinary 
infringement, and enhanced levels of damages for the exceptional cases 
of willful infringement.”34  The resulting case law does not reflect the 
“tripartite structure”35 of 17 U.S.C. § 504.36  Often, instead, the courts 
have granted awards on the basis of “the largely compensatory impulse 
underlying statutory damages” for cases of innocent and ordinary 
infringement, while “focus[ing] too heavily on deterrence and 
punishment” in finding ordinary infringers to be willful.37 
Furthermore, in light of the risks that statutory damages awards 
“can be arbitrary and excessive,”38 some in the legal field advocate that 
27. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531 (1987); Milene
Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288 (1982). 
28. Zawada, supra note 14, at 134. 
29. WB Music Corp. v. RTV Communication Group, Inc., 445 F.3d 538, 540 (2006). 
30. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 444 (2009). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 445. 
35. Id. at 444. 
36. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 30, at 445. 
37. Id. 
38. Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright
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“extra-compensatory” damages should receive the due process review 
afforded to punitive damages:39 
When aggregated over large numbers of works . . . even the 
minimum statutory damage award has a punitive effect and imposes 
an unconstitutional grossly excessive penalty. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) 
merely specifies a very wide range within which a statutory damage 
award per work infringed must fall, leaving gross discretion to the 
judge or jury, but even the minimum statutory damage amount can 
be excessive when aggregated based on the number of works 
infringed.40 
And while the law is settled that “grossly excessive” punitive 
damages awards violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,41 
the Supreme Court has also recognized that, in certain circumstances, 
“large awards of statutory damages can raise due process concerns.”42 
The Court studies the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages in cases where punitive damages may be excessive.43 
Embracing this rationale, lower courts have found that an exorbitant 
award of statutory damages may violate due process if the amount is “out 
of all reasonable proportion”44 to the harm caused by defendant’s 
conduct—in the interest of this note, the copyright infringer’s infringing 
actions. 
C. 17 U.S.C. § 504 and the “One-Work Limitation”
 Copyright law is codified in Title 17 of the United States Code; § 
504 specifies the remedies for infringement, including actual damages, 
profits, and statutory damages.  The relevant portions of § 504(c)(1) and 
(2), pertaining to statutory damages, are reproduced below: 
(1) [T]he copyright holder may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work .
. . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court
Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 307 (2009). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 308. 
41. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 04-1671
MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) (first citing State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003), then citing 1 BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996)). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580) (the ratio between
punitive damages and compensatory damages is “the most commonly cited indicium of an 
unreasonable or excessive . . . award”). 
44. Id. 
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considers just.  For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a 
compilation or derivative work constitute one work.45 
(2) In a case where the [court finds] that infringement was committed
willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.  In a case
where the [court finds that the] infringer was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.46
As § 504 indicates, and as the Circuits’ differing tests exemplify, 
predicting the amount of statutory damages awarded in any given 
copyright infringement case is not easily done, despite the seemingly 
formulaic approach described above, largely because an award may fall 
within a broad statutory range.47  Non-willful infringers are liable for 
$750–$30,000 per work infringed.48  The maximum penalty increases to 
$150,000 per work infringed for willful infringers, and even “innocent” 
infringers are liable for at least $200 per work infringed.49 
 The unpredictability of statutory damages awards is compounded 
by the issue under dissection in this note: the “one-work limitation” in § 
504(c)(1).  To the infringer’s advantage, the “one-work limitation,” 
when applicable, “significantly reduces” liability since “one infringed 
work merits only one grant of statutory damages, no matter how many 
times the work has been infringed.”50  The last sentence of § 504(c)(1) 
appears unambiguous: “all the parts of a compilation51 or derivative 
work52 constitute one work” (emphases added).  But the confusion arises 
45. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017). 
46. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017). 
47. Andrew Berger, Why It’s Difficult to Predict the Amount of Statutory Damages
Plaintiff Will Be Awarded in Copyright Litigation-Revised Version, IP In BRIEF (Jan. 10, 
2012), http://www.ipinbrief.com/whyitsdifficultpredictstatutorydamages/. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Andrew Berger, Here Are Some More Answers to End the Confusion About Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Litigation (Part II), IP IN BRIEF (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.ipinbrief.com/ending-confusion-statutory-damages-ii/ [hereinafter Berger, 
Statutory Damages in Copyright Litigation]. 
51. “A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting 
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term ‘compilation’ includes 
collective works.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2017). 
52. “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work 
of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2017). 
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because the statute does not clarify whose compilation or derivative 
work it refers to.53  That is, the compilation or derivative work could be 
either plaintiff’s copyrighted work that defendant infringed or 
defendant’s work created from a number of plaintiff’s separately 
copyrighted works.54 
 The courts disagree as to whether § 504(c)(1) addresses the 
plaintiff or the defendant as the owner of the compilation or derivative 
work.  Most courts assume that the “one-work limitation” applies to 
plaintiff’s copyrighted works, which defendant has infringed,55 while 
other courts have found that the limitation bears upon defendant’s works, 
regardless of how many of plaintiff’s separate copyrighted works may 
be infringed.56 
D. The Circuit Split: Two Approaches
 In deciding what constitutes “one work” for the purposes of 
calculating statutory damages in copyright infringement cases, the 
Circuits are split between two approaches.57  The first is a “ ‘ functional 
[test], with the focus on whether each expression . . . has an independent 
economic value and is, in itself, viable.’ ” 58  The second test, sometimes 
referred to as the “issuance test,”59 assesses “ ‘whether the plaintiff—the 
copyright holder—issued its works separately, or together as a unit.’ ” 60 
At least four Circuits have adopted the independent economic value 
test,61 while at least one Circuit has specifically rejected it in favor of the 
issuance test.62 
53. Berger, Statutory Damages in Copyright Litigation, supra note 50. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. See id. (In a case where the defendant packaged 64 of plaintiff’s photographs into
four magazine compilations, the court found that plaintiff was still limited to only four 
statutory damages awards). 
57. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018). 
58. Id. (quoting Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 
1993)). 
59. Adam D. Riser, Defining “Compilation”: The Second Circuit’s Formalist Approach
and the Resulting Issuance Test, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 822, 824 (2012) (discussing 
“the Second Circuit's issuance test developed in Bryant II”). 
60. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bryant v. Media 
Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
61. Andrew Berger, When Does a Copyrighted Work Qualify as a “Work” for Purposes 
of Fixing Statutory Damages?, IP In BRIEF (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.ipinbrief.com/mcsmusic/ [hereinafter Berger, Copyrighted Work] (listing the 
First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits as having adopted the independent economic value 
test). 
62. BMG Rights Mgmt., 199 F. Supp. 3d at 983 (citing Bryant, 603 F.3d at 142, decided
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1. The Independent Economic Value Test
The First Circuit, in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea,63
articulated the independent economic value test.  There, the exclusive 
licensee of videotape recordings of television programs filed suit for 
copyright infringement against a video rental store operator.64  The 
district court entered judgment for plaintiff-licensee65 and ordered 
defendant-video rental store operator to pay plaintiff $2,500 in statutory 
damages for one work infringed.66  On appeal, the First Circuit agreed 
with the lower court’s finding that defendant-store operator had 
infringed copyrights for the original recordings of the television 
programs and that plaintiff-licensee had exclusive rights to distribute the 
copyrighted recordings.67  Because the court found that plaintiff-licensee 
had exclusive rights, the plaintiff was entitled to recover statutory 
damages for defendant-store operator’s copyright infringement of the 
recordings.68  But at this point, the court of appeals reversed the district 
court’s finding as to the number of works infringed for which defendant 
was liable.69 
 The district court found that defendant-store holder had infringed 
one work (comprising four episodes of a television program, Jade Fox) 
for the purposes of calculating statutory damages70 based on two facts. 
First, plaintiff-licensee sold or rented only complete sets of Jade Fox to 
defendant-store holder; accordingly, the court inferred that plaintiff 
regarded Jade Fox episodes “as one work for economic purposes 
notwithstanding the rental by customers of only a few episodes at a time 
or its production in separate episodes.”71  Second, the copyrights for the 
four episodes of Jade Fox in question were registered with the Copyright 
Office on a single form,72 suggesting to the court that “[the author of 
Jade Fox] considered at least these four episodes to be one work.”73  The 
court of appeals was not persuaded by the district court’s reasoning with 
regard to either fact.74 
Instead, the First Circuit, counting each episode of Jade Fox as a 
by the Second Circuit). 
63. Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1106. 
64. Id. at 1109. 
65. Id. at 1110. 
66. Id. at 1119. 
67. Id. at 1110. 
68. See id. at 1117–18.
69. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993). 
70. Id. at 1108. 
71. Id. at 1117 (quoting the district court’s opinion).
72. Id. 
73. Id. (quoting the district court’s opinion).
74. Id. 
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separate copyrighted work, stated that defendant had infringed four 
works, not merely one.75  On the district court’s first argument, the First 
Circuit asserted that “[a] distributor’s decision to sell or rent complete 
sets of a series to video stores in no way indicates that each episode in 
the series is unable to stand alone.”76  The court pointed expressly to the 
fact that renters may rent and watch “as few or as many tapes as they 
want”—perhaps without ever renting or watching all of the episodes in 
a series—77 and, furthermore, each episode of Jade Fox was separately 
produced.78 
On the district court’s second argument, the First Circuit could not 
find supporting authority for the district court’s conclusion that 
registering multiple works with the Copyright Office on a single form 
equates to registering a single work for purposes of awarding statutory 
damages.79  Studying the language of the Copyright Office’s regulations 
with respect to registration,80 the court found that a copyright holder may 
register multiple works on a single form as a single work for the 
purposes of registration without forfeiting the option of recovering 
statutory damages in future for infringement for each work registered.81 
A Ninth Circuit district court reached a similar outcome on the issue 
of the number of works that qualify for statutory damages in Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo,82 where defendants operated a website 
through which they provided and sold access to thousands of 
unauthorized copies of plaintiff’s copyrighted photographs.83 
Defendants argued that they were liable for infringing only one 
copyrighted work because the images in question appeared as a 
collection in only one of plaintiff’s copyrighted magazines.84  The court 
rejected this contention, finding defendants guilty of 7,475 incidents of 
copyright infringement, and plaintiff recovered statutory damages in the 
amount of $500 for each infringed work (totaling $3,737,500).85 
In explanation, the court cited the independent economic value test 
applied in Gamma Audio & Video, looking to whether each of plaintiff’s 
photographs “has an ‘independent economic value’ and is viable on its 
75. Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1119. 
76. Id. at 1117. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(A). 
81. Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1117. 
82. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97–0670–IEG (LSP), 1998 WL 207856
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1998). 
83. Id. at *1. 
84. Id. at *5. 
85. Id. 
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own.”86  That is, “separate copyrights are not distinct works unless they 
can ‘live their own copyright life.’ ” 87  The court found that each image 
had an independent economic value and was viable on its own, 
elaborating that “although each of these images may have appeared in a 
[single magazine], these images are subject to re-use and redistribution 
in accordance with various licensing arrangements.”88  In approving an 
award of statutory damages for 7,475 incidents of copyright 
infringement, the court further reasoned that each of plaintiff’s 
photographs constituted a separate copyrighted work because (1) each 
image represented an independent and “copyrightable” effort involving 
a particular model, photographer, and location, (2) all of the images 
remained individual efforts despite being compiled into one magazine, 
and (3) defendants provided and sold access to each image separately.89 
Several courts continue to employ the independent economic value 
test as expressed in Gamma Audio & Video (1993),90 though some, such 
as the Playboy Enterprises court (1998), have contributed to or modified 
the list of factors to consider in determining what constitutes “one work” 
for the purposes of calculating statutory damages.91  Thus, some 
inconsistency exists among the Circuits that favor this approach, as 
demonstrated by a case predating Gamma Audio & Video and one 
succeeding Playboy Enterprises.92 
In Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,93 a 1990 case, defendant sold shirts 
featuring Minnie and Mickey Mouse in six different poses.94  The district 
court found defendant guilty of six incidents of infringement and 
awarded Disney $15,000 in statutory damages per infringement.95  On 
appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment.96 
Although the court acknowledged that “Mickey and Minnie are certainly 
distinct, viable works with separate economic value and copyright lives 
of their own,” it could not extend the independent economic value test 
to include each of defendant’s six shirt designs depicting different poses 
86. Id. (quoting Gamma Audio & Video, 11 F.3d at 1116–17). 
87. Id. (quoting Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
88. Playboy Enterprises, 1998 WL 207856, at *5. 
89. Id. 
90. Berger, Copyrighted Work, supra note 61 (listing the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits as having adopted the independent economic value test). 
91. Playboy Enterprises, 1998 WL 207856, at *5. 
92. See Disney, 897 F.2d 565; MCS Music America, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3:09-cv-
00597, 2010 WL 500430 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010). 
93. Disney, 897 F.2d at 565. 
94. Id. at 567. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 570. 
386 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:58 
by the mice, limiting the number of works infringed to only two.97  In 
calculating statutory damages, the court held that the number of works, 
not the number of infringements, is determinative: “Mickey is still 
Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning, running or walking, waving 
his left hand or his right.”98 
More recently, in 2010, the court in MCS Music America, Inc. v. 
Yahoo! Inc.99 added “a further wrinkle” to the independent economic 
value test, holding that multiple musical compositions—all of which 
may have independent economic value—do not qualify for statutory 
damages if the works are essentially the same.100  In MCS Music 
America, plaintiffs owned exclusive copyrights of 215 musical 
compositions; defendants digitally transmitted 308 sound recordings 
embodying all 215 of plaintiff’s copyrighted works, though plaintiffs did 
not claim ownership of these recordings.101  Plaintiffs sought to recover 
statutory damages for each of defendant’s recordings (all 308), claiming 
that each was a separate and independent work.102  Defendants disagreed, 
arguing that plaintiffs could not recover for defendant’s recordings since 
plaintiffs had no ownership rights to them.103 
Following the reasoning in Disney, the court declared that “even 
though each musical composition is a distinct, viable work with separate 
economic value and copyright lives of their own, any variation of that 
‘work’ is still simply one ‘work’ for the purposes of statutory 
damages.”104  To recover statutory damages, a work must be registered 
with the Copyright Office, and plaintiffs had neither ownership nor 
registration rights to defendant’s recordings.105  Thus, defendant’s sound 
recordings, as variations of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, did not 
constitute separate works for which plaintiffs could recover statutory 
damages.106 
The independent economic value test, therefore, exists today as 
some combination of the rules set forth by various courts, including 
those that decided Gamma Audio & Video, Playboy Enterprises, Disney, 
and MCS Music America.  All variations of the test inquire into whether 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. MCS Music America, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00597, 2010 WL 500430
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010). 
100. Berger, Copyrighted Work, supra note 61. 
101. MCS Music America, 2010 WL 500430, at *2. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at *3. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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a work has independent economic value and is viable on its own.107 
Some courts have phrased these requirements as asking whether each 
work can “live [its] own copyright life.”108  Other courts have 
emphasized that an award of statutory damages is available only to 
works that have “a viable economic life as well as a viable copyright life 
distinct from other works at issue.”109 
2. The Issuance Test
Whereas the first approach may be termed a functional test—
computing the number of awards as a function of the economic viability, 
if any, of each work110—the second test focuses on “whether the 
plaintiff—the copyright holder—issued its works separately, or together 
as a unit.”111  In Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc.,112 songwriters 
and their record label brought suit for copyright infringement against a 
production company and a music wholesaler, on the grounds that the 
production company authorized the music wholesaler to create digital 
copies of individual songs from plaintiffs’ albums that were available 
online.113  The district court held that plaintiffs’ albums were 
compilations and granted only one award of statutory damages per 
album infringed, irrespective of the number of songs copied by 
defendants.114 
 On appeal, Bryant required the Second Circuit to address one of 
the ambiguities inherent in the language of the statutory damages 
provision in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), namely whether the word 
“compilation” in the “one-work limitation” (“all the parts of a 
compilation or derivative work constitute one work”) alludes to the 
infringed work created by plaintiff or the infringing work that defendant 
devised from plaintiff’s copyrighted works.115  The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s award of statutory damages on a per-album 
basis,116 relying on two of its previous decisions on the issue of “what 
107. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116–17 (1st Cir. 1993). 
108. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
109. Berger, Copyrighted Work, supra note 61. 
110. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Comm., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 958, 983 (E.D.
Va. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 881 F. 3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018). 
111. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2010). 
112. Id. at 135. 
113. Id. at 138–39. 
114. Id. at 139. 
115. Andrew Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights: The Second Circuit Provides Some Further
Answers About the “One-Work Limitation” on Grants of Statutory Damages Involving an 
Infringing Compilation, IP In BRIEF (May 6, 2010), http://www.ipinbrief.com/bryant/ 
[hereinafter Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights]. 
116. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 142. 
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constitutes a compilation subject to § 504(c)(1)’s one-award 
restriction”:117 Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications 
International, Ltd.118 and WB Music Corp. v. RTV Communication 
Group, Inc.119 
In Twin Peaks, plaintiff “issued each episode of a television series 
sequentially, each at a different time”; defendant “printed eight teleplays 
from the series in one book” (emphasis added).120  There, the Second 
Circuit granted plaintiff a separate award of statutory damages for each 
of the eight teleplays because plaintiff had issued its works separately.121 
The court, deferring to the “plain language” of § 504(c)(1), distinguished 
Bryant from Twin Peaks: “[h]ere, it is the copyright holders who issued 
their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue [a]lbums.”122  Thus, 
the Bryant plaintiffs’ recovery is limited to one award of statutory 
damages per album.123 
WB Music Corp. likewise failed to support the Bryant plaintiffs’ 
claim for statutory damages on a per-song basis.  In that case, plaintiff 
had issued thirteen songs separately.124  Again, defendant gathered the 
individual works into one compilation—an album.125  Plaintiff recovered 
a separate award of statutory damages for each of the thirteen songs 
because defendant presented no evidence “that any of the separately 
copyrighted works were included in a compilation authorized by the 
[plaintiff]” (emphasis original).126 
 In explicitly declining to adopt the independent economic value 
test approved by some other Circuits,127 the Second Circuit stressed that 
the language of § 504(c)(1) permits “no exception for a part of a 
compilation that has independent economic value.”128  The court 
recognized that infringers can now more easily copy parts of an album 
separately due to the increasing availability of music digitally and 
online,129 but ultimately refused to endorse the independent economic 
117. Id. at 141. 
118. Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir.
1993). 
119. WB Music Corp. v. RTV Comm. Group, Inc., 445 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2006). 
120. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141 (citing Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1381). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citing WB Music Corp., 445 F.3d at 541). 
125. Id. 
126. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. 
127. “This Court has never adopted the independent economic value test, and we decline
to do so in this case.” Id. at 142. 
128. Id. (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)). 
129. Id. 
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value test because doing so would contradict Congress’s intent in 
drafting § 504(c)(1).130  The “one-work limitation” “applies even if the 
parts of the compilation are ‘regarded as independent works for other 
purposes.’ ” 131 
 Hence, the issuance test for determining what constitutes “one 
work”—which endeavors to identify copyrighted works as either 
separately issued or released as parts of a unit—presents a seemingly 
simple formula, as established by the Second Circuit in a series of cases. 
The deciding factor appears largely to be plaintiff’s intent132 in each 
case—that is, whether plaintiff produced the infringed works 
individually or as a single compilation.  Nonetheless, the issuance test is 
not without some vagueness: an infringer is liable only for as many 
awards of statutory damages as matches the total number of separate 
works, despite the fact that the individual parts of a compilation may be 
“regarded as independent works for other purposes.”133 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
 The Circuits are divided in their approaches to deciding what 
constitutes “one work” for the purposes of recovering an award of 
statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504.  Because the Copyright Act of 
1976 does not define the word “work,” the courts differ in their 
interpretations of the “one-work limitation” imposed by § 504(c)(1),134 
that “all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one 
work.”135  Some courts, including the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits, have adhered to a functional approach, the independent 
economic value test, holding that “a distinct ‘work’ must be able to live 
its own copyright life.”136  Other courts, notably the Second Circuit, 
apply the issuance test, prioritizing the number of works issued 
separately—each retaining its own copyright—as opposed to those 
created as a unit, all of which are protected by a single copyright.137 
 Federal courts “have exclusive jurisdiction over actions that arise 
under federal copyright laws.”138  Thus, the lack of homogeneity among 
130. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)). 
131. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)). 
132. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. 
133. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 at 162 (1976). 
134. Zawada, supra note 14, at 142. 
135. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2017). 
136. Zawada, supra note 14, at 142.
137. See Bryant, 603 F.3d 135; Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d 1366; WB Music Corp.,
445 F.3d 538. 
138. Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)) 
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act 
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the federal courts in adjudicating awards of statutory damages in 
copyright infringement cases generates uncertainty:139 the courts’ 
differing approaches could be problematic for copyright holders that are 
victims of infringement in multiple jurisdictions.140  The entertainment 
industry, which is “at the center of many copyright disputes,”141 is 
especially likely to encounter the most unpredictability as a result of the 
Circuit split,142 owing to the fact that New York and Los Angeles “now 
face different [statutory] award possibilities depending on the 
jurisdiction.”143 
Therefore, the inherent variability in awards of statutory damages 
under 17 U.S.C. § 504144—a consequence of the courts’ discretionary 
power145—is compounded by the Circuits’ contrasting interpretations of 
and tests for determining what constitutes “one work” for copyright 
infringement purposes, and a means of resolving this dispute is 
necessary to achieve uniformity of the law in every jurisdiction. 
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Independent Economic Value Test
1. Unsupported by the Plain Language of the Copyright Act of
1976 and Its Legislative History 
Though several of the Circuits have implemented and continue to 
employ the independent economic value test for addressing the “one-
work limitation,” some in the legal field contend that these Circuits have 
interpreted § 504(c)(1) too broadly.146  Attesting to the involvement of 
special interest groups in drafting copyright laws, opponents of the 
independent economic value test argue that § 504(c)(1) “should be 
of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.”). 
139. Riser, supra note 59, at 846. 
140. For example, forum shopping in internet piracy cases. Id. 
141. Id. at 846–47. 
142. Id. at 846. 
143. Id. 
144. Statutory damages range from $200 per work infringed in cases of “innocent”
infringement to $150,000 per work infringed in cases of willful infringement. 17 U.S.C.A. § 
504(c)(1)–(2) (West 2017). 
145. “In a case where the [court finds] that infringement was committed willfully, the
court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than 
$150,000. In a case where the [court finds that the] infringer was not aware and had no reason 
to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its 
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200” 
(emphases added). 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017). 
146. Betselot A. Zeleke, Federal Judges Gone Wild: The Copyright Act of 1976 and 
Technology, Rejecting the Independent Economic Value Test, 55 HOW. L.J. 247, 268 (2011). 
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narrowly construed against infringement so as not to confer any benefit 
on a special interest group that has not bargained for such an advantage 
during negotiations.”147  Accordingly, these critics support the Second 
Circuit’s narrower interpretation148of the statute and its adoption of the 
issuance test, under which a court should grant multiple awards of 
statutory damages only if the copyright holder issued its works 
independently.149 
One facet of the independent economic value test at odds with the 
1976 Act and its legislative history is that judiciary discretion may still 
allow “excessive statutory damages,”150 despite the “per infringed work” 
provision in the 1976 Act intended to counter the wording in the 1909 
Act that permitted multiple awards of statutory damages for a single 
infringed “work.”151  Under the 1909 Act, a copyright holder was entitled 
to recover statutory damages “per infringement” from the infringer.152 
The 1976 Act, however, limits statutory damages to one award “per 
infringement work,” regardless of the number of infringements of the 
same “work.”153  But the independent economic value test weakens the 
1976 Act’s limits on the court’s discretion by “allowing a judge to 
inquire into the economic viability of parts of a compilation of 
‘work.’ ” 154  By contrast, the issuance test strictly enforces the “one-
work limitation” where compilations, not individual works, have been 
infringed. 
2. The Dangers of Enhancing Excessive Statutory Damages
Further detracting from the feasibility of the independent economic
value test is the risk of exacerbating excessively large awards of statutory 
damages.155  Statutory damages for copyright infringement may be as 
low as $200 and as high as $150,000 per work infringed.156  In a 
jurisdiction that endorses the independent economic value test, courts 
may be inclined to grant multiple awards of statutory damages as a 
punitive measure.157  Copyright infringers then face the prospect of 
pecuniary liabilities “so extreme as to amount to a criminal penalty 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See infra Section I.D.2.
150. Zeleke, supra note 146, at 268. 
151. Id. at 269. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 270. 
155. Id. at 278. 
156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2) (West 2017). 
157. Zeleke, supra note 146, at 279. 
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imposed without providing the defendant[s] with the benefits of the 
safeguards the criminal law system provides,”158—perhaps so extreme 
as to be unconstitutional.159 
Playboy Enterprises serves as an example of multiple awards of 
statutory damages amounting to an immensely (and possibly 
excessively) large payout: the court found defendants guilty of 
infringing 7,475 of plaintiff’s photographs and plaintiff recovered $500 
for each infringed work—totaling $3,737,500.160  The Playboy 
Enterprises court authorized this hefty compensatory sum under the 
independent economic value test, but critics of this approach 
discriminate between the compensatory and non-compensatory 
(punitive) components of statutory damages.161        
While the compensatory component grants relief to the copyright 
holder for the actual loss he or she suffered,162 the non-compensatory 
component punishes the infringer and deters others from committing the 
same offense.163  The 1976 Act, through 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), provides 
for punitive damages by allowing the court to increase awards of 
statutory damages in cases of willful infringement164 (to the statutory 
maximum of $150,000 per work infringed).  And because the 1976 Act 
affords the court the discretion to award both compensatory and non-
compensatory damages, the independent economic value test, at least as 
currently enforced, unjustifiably magnifies the punitive impact of 
statutory damages for copyright infringement. 
158. Id. (citing Blaine Evanson, Due Process in Statutory Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 601 (2005) (“Since punitive damages act in a quasi-criminal manner, ‘straddling’ civil 
and criminal penalties, they run the risk of imposing what amount to criminal penalties 
without the increased safeguards that criminal law offers.”). 
159. Id. (citing J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal
File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for 
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526 (2004) (“These [copyright] lawsuits 
illustrate that the punitive effect of even the minimum statutory damage award, when 
aggregated across a large number of similar acts, can grow so enormous that it becomes an 
unconstitutionally excessive punishment.”). 
160. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97–0670–IEG (LSP), 1998 WL 207856,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1998). 
161. Zeleke, supra note 146, at 279 (citing Blaine Evanson, Due Process in Statutory 
Damages, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 601 (2005)). 
162. See generally id. 
163. See generally id. at 280. 
164. See generally id. 
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B. The Issuance Test
1. Shielding Infringers
Despite the issuance test’s strict adherence to the legislative intent
of the “one-work limitation,”165 its narrower approach effectively 
“shelters infringement,”166 accomplishing the opposite goal of copyright 
law, which purports to encourage creation by protecting the creators—
the copyright holders.167  The issuance test “shields infringers from 
multiple awards of statutory damages no matter how many works they 
infringe” merely because the copyright holder chose to issue the 
infringed works as a compilation and not as separate works.168 
 Bryant highlights this paradox.  In that case, plaintiffs sought to 
recover statutory damages for each of several songs that defendants 
copied from plaintiff’s digital albums, but the court held that each album 
constituted a compilation and granted plaintiffs only one award of 
statutory damages per album.169  The Bryant court’s decision 
underscores the “shielding” that the “one-work limitation” affords 
copyright infringers under the issuance test.  Digital technology readily 
aids infringers in dissociating compilations (albums) into separate works 
(individual songs),170 yet 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) only compensates the 
copyright holder for one incident of infringement, “irrespective of the 
number of songs copied” by the infringer.171 
2. Incentivizing Infringement
The issuance test defeats, at least in part, the goal of copyright
law—encouraging creation by protecting the creators172—not solely 
because its interpretation of § 504(c)(1) “shelters infringement.”  The 
test also “incentivizes infringement.”173  In a jurisdiction that follows the 
issuance test, potential copyright infringers “may be more likely to 
increase infringement”174 of compilations if they are aware that the court 
will, at most, grant only one award of statutory damages for each 
compilation infringed, not separate damages for each individual work 
infringed.  For example, an infringer intending to illegally download a 
165. Id. at 268. 
166. Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights, supra note 115. 
167. “The one-work limitation, instead of stimulating creation, shelters infringement.” Id.
168. Id. 
169. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2010).
170. Berger, Bryant v. Media Rights, supra note 115. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Riser, supra note 59, at 849. 
174. Id. 
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single copyrighted song is “incentivized” to obtain the entire album 
because the issuance test imposes no additional awards of statutory 
damages for infringing the album as opposed to infringing one or more 
songs.175 
 Awarding statutory damages advances two objectives: providing 
relief for a plaintiff whose copyrights have been infringed and penalizing 
defendant’s infringing conduct.176  Under the issuance test, however, 
infringers are subject to relatively smaller penalties177 and are 
consequently less inclined to refrain from infringing.178  Although 
Congress has regularly expanded the scope of copyright protections over 
time,179 the incentivizing nature of the issuance test impedes the goal of 
copyright law, which is to promote creation.  Authors may be less willing 
to create new works—or, at least, to share them with the public—if they 
are unlikely to receive adequate compensation in the event of 
infringement.180 
 The holdings in Twin Peaks and WB Music Corp. compared with 
the outcome in Bryant demonstrates the fallibility of the issuance test. 
In Twin Peaks, plaintiff issued several episodes of a television series 
“sequentially, each at a different time,”181 eight of which defendant 
printed as teleplays in one book.  The Second Circuit awarded plaintiff 
separate statutory damages for each of the eight teleplays because 
plaintiff had issued the episodes individually.  The same court likewise 
upheld separate awards of statutory damages in WB Music Corp., where 
plaintiff had issued thirteen songs independently that defendant 
compiled into an album.  In each case, because defendant created one 
infringing compilation, plaintiff recovered statutory damages for 
multiple works.  By contrast, the Bryant plaintiff received only one 
award of damages because defendant separated plaintiff’s compilation 
(album) into independent works (songs).  Thus, the issuance test 
performs inconsistently, predominantly depending upon, in the words of 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. The court may grant a maximum of $150,000 per work infringed in statutory 
damages for willful infringement, but the infringer would potentially be found liable for fewer 
incidents of infringement in an issuance test jurisdiction than in an independent economic 
value test jurisdiction (i.e., in the Second Circuit versus the First Circuit, respectively). See 17 
U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2); see e.g., Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 
2010); Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993). 
178. Riser, supra note 59, at 849. 
179. Congress has expanded the scope of copyright protections “to extend additional
protections and term limits to copyright holders.” Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Twin Peaks Productions, 996 F.2d at 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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the Second Circuit, whether defendant is able to prove “that any of the 
separately copyrighted works were included in a compilation authorized 
by the [plaintiff].”182 
3. The Lack of Punitive Measures
Beyond its deficiencies with regard to shielding infringers and even
incentivizing infringement, the issuance test is an ineffective approach 
to defining the “one-work limitation” because it lacks sufficient punitive 
measures.183  The inadequacy of the punitive provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 
504, manifest in the issuance test, favors the infringer.  For example,184 
a trial court may order a willful infringer to pay multiple awards of 
substantial statutory damages for infringing numerous songs,185 but on 
appeal, a Circuit court employing the issuance test may reduce the 
infringer’s liability by finding that only a small number of groups of 
songs were infringed.186  In these circumstances, requiring merely that 
the infringer receives a favorable ruling on the issue of the number of 
works infringed, “an infringer may profit in spite of a judgment awarding 
maximum statutory damages. . . .”187 
The issuance test for awarding statutory damages fails to deter 
infringement in a second scenario, in which infringement occurs 
“vertically” via a “distribution network.”188  To take another example,189 
consider the chain of infringement that could befall a copyright holder 
of a sound recording through a distribution network: 
 If the distributors violated only the distribution right . . . and the 
manufacturers violated only the reproduction right, then [plaintiff] 
may have been able to seek a separate award [of statutory damages] 
from each defendant . . . But imagine that the defendants controlled 
both manufacturing and distribution, rather than just distribution, 
and vertically integrated the creation of each infringing [work] into 
its distribution network.190 
182. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2010). 
183. See R. Collins Kilgore, Sneering at the Law: An Argument for Punitive Damages in
Copyright, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637, 640 (2013). 
184. Example adapted. See id. at 664. 
185. Id. 
186. Additionally, if the infringer chose “not to defend at the trial level to avoid discovery
and the costs of litigation” and received a favorable ruling on the issue of the number of works 
infringed, no appeal would be necessary, “saving [the infringer] substantially on legal fees.” 
Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 661. 
189. Example adapted. See Kilgore, supra note 183, at 661. 
190. Id. 
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Defendants’ various infringing actions would no longer be separate 
and, correspondingly, the number of awards of statutory damages 
decreases;191 the distribution network acts a loophole undermining the 
deterrent power of § 504.  Additionally, minimizing the number of 
infringers exacerbates the incentivizing effect of the issuance test:192 “an 
infringer [such as a distribution network] may profit in spite of a 
judgment awarding maximum statutory damages. . . .”193 Willful 
infringers need no greater inducement.  The issuance test, therefore, is a 
defective deterrent against copyright infringement. 
C. One Test for the “One-Work Limitation”
 Circuit splits in the field of intellectual property are common 
because the Supreme Court is simply unable to hear every case for which 
it receives petitions, not to mention resolve every issue over which the 
lower courts are divided.194  During both the 2009 and 2010 terms, the 
Court reviewed only one copyright case.195  The Circuit courts’ dockets 
are similarly brimming with non-copyright cases: in 2009, the Federal 
Circuit decided 312 patent cases on the merits, while all of the other 
courts of appeals combined only decided 168 trademark, copyright, and 
patent cases on the merits.196  For these reasons, copyright holders whose 
works have been infringed have ample motive to forum shop among the 
Circuit courts.197 
 Copyright holders have even greater enticement to select the most 
advantageous court when seeking statutory damages due to the 
ambiguity of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)’s “one-work limitation.”  Congress 
could have—and probably should have, in light of the split in 
authority—defined what constitutes “one work” for the purposes of 
calculating statutory damages, but Congress did not do so.198  Hence, to 
rectify the uncertainty clouding the adjudication of often exceptionally 
large sums of money, to ensure that creation is protected, and to deter 
future illegal conduct, the independent economic value test and the 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 662.
193. Id. at 664. 
194. Samantha M. Basso, When National Law Means Regional Law: A Look at the Non-
Uniformity of Copyright Law and How the Federal Circuit Can Help, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 355, 
356–57 (2011). 
195. The author notes that patent law has “benefited greatly from the creation of the 
Federal Circuit.” Inventors now receive more guidance with regard to the validity of their 
patents across the country, and the Federal Circuit judges are well-versed in patent law. “The 
‘other’ forms of intellectual property, however, do not enjoy such treatment.” Id. at 356. 
196. Id. at 363–64. 
197. Id. at 357. 
198. Zeleke, supra note 146, at 280. 
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issuance test should be reconciled in a new formulation that draws upon 
the assets of both. 
IV. PROPOSAL
 An ideal test for the “one-work limitation” of 17 U.S.C. § 
504(c)(1) achieves equilibrium between the undisputed economic value 
of a copyright and the imperative that copyright holders are assured 
protection for their creations. 
 The independent economic value test, by itself, accords plaintiffs 
(in some cases) “absurd amounts of damages.”199  Shifting the standard 
for “one work” from “per infringement” to “per infringed work”200 
commits perhaps too much economic value to each of plaintiff’s 
infringed works, with such value to be appraised at the judge’s discretion 
and nothing else.201  A new test for the “one-work limitation” should 
limit measures of economic value to predetermined (statutory) 
parameters202 to preclude obscenely excessive awards as well as awards 
so small as to have no significant compensatory (or punitive) effect. 
These parameters should be reevaluated and, if appropriate, increased or 
decreased periodically to accurately reflect the “current” value of the 
copyrighted works at issue.  Thus, the number of works that qualify for 
awards of statutory damages depends upon whether each “work” in 
question satisfies the statutory minimum threshold for sufficient 
economic value. 
 The issuance test, on its own, recoups the inordinate payouts that 
its counterpart may award, but demands a punitive element to deter 
would-be infringers.  Although due process prohibits “grossly 
excessive” punitive damages awards,203 in a new test for the “one-work 
limitation,” Congress could implement statutory parameters to prevent 
unconstitutional “extra-compensatory”204 damages, and the court could 
adjust these parameters to suit individual defendants.  For example, the 
punitive aspect of statutory damages awards may be exactly enough to 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Judges are, of course, limited by the statutory minimum and maximum awards, as
stated in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2). 
202. This author considered drafting a new test that would permit expert testimony, in
very limited circumstances, to supplement the statutory parameters. Inviting such testimony, 
however, could lead to grossly excessive awards if not checked by judicial or statutory 
guidance. 
203. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 04-1671
MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005). 
204. Berg, supra note 38, at 307. 
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negate defendant’s profits;205 this threshold amount is necessary to 
persuade copyright holders to “invest in and enforce their 
copyrights”206when they are unable to prove actual damages.  But 
beyond ensuring that copyright holders “break even,” the statutory 
scheme for punitive damages should impose a minimum penalty 
independent of the compensatory damages awarded on the basis of 
economic value.  One component of the award remedies plaintiff’s 
injury; the other punishes infringement and deters future illegal conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The Circuit courts, limited and influenced by the particular cases 
brought before them, have attempted individually to define what 
constitutes “one work” in copyright infringement cases for the purposes 
of calculating statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504.  As a result, two 
leading approaches have emerged, the independent economic value test 
and the issuance test.  But the lack of uniformity among the Circuits 
regarding the “correct” interpretation of the “one-work limitation” of § 
504 has engendered uncertainty as to whether a court will, in any given 
case, award exorbitant compensatory damages to a copyright holder or 
impose punitive damages upon the infringer sufficient to deter potential 
future wrongdoers.  Therefore, until the Supreme Court mandates 
otherwise, a new test for the “one-work limitation” should encompass 
the advantages of each of the two current tests with modifications to 
better serve the twin goals of copyright law: fostering creation and 
deterring misappropriation of others’ creative efforts. 
205. Kilgore, supra note 183, at 640. 
206. Id. at 642. 
